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GOLDEN V. NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL
(decided May 19, 2003)
SARAH KROLL-ROSENBAUM*
Tocqueville observed that early America possessed “a secret
tendency in democratic institutions, which [made] the exertions of
the citizens subservient to the prosperity of the community, in spite
of their vices and mistakes.”1  This not so “secret tendency” is the
very purpose of American representative democracy.  Voters elect
representatives to centralize and streamline the policy-making pro-
cess.  The electorate is then freed to carry on with other aspects of
their daily lives.  Occasionally, policy decisions are posed directly to
voters through initiatives and voter referenda, the most common
instruments of direct democracy.  Voters either approve or reject
these citizen- or legislature-sponsored policies at the ballot box.2
Beyond the instrumentalities of electoral choice, questions inevita-
bly emerge about the balance of decision-making powers in the rare
instances of voter-legislated policy.  Does the direct will of the peo-
ple stand or, can a legislature interpose its authority to amend or
overturn a law enacted through a voter referendum?  Within this
theoretical framework, legal limits must exist to delineate the
boundaries of decision-making powers.
In Golden v. New York City Council,3 the New York Appellate Di-
vision, Second Department, addressed the issue of divided powers
between voters and legislature as applied to New York City Council
* J.D. candidate New York Law School, 2005. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges Cameron Stracher, Stephanie Trager, and Lesli Wybiral for their insightful edito-
rial feedback.
1. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 102 (Richard D. Heffner ed.,
Mentor Books 1956) (1835).
2. Election law governing the use of ballot initiatives and referenda varies be-
tween state and local governments.  Generally, there are petitioning and approval re-
quirements for citizen-sponsored ballot initiatives.  Likewise, state and local election law
mandates voter referendum for certain legislative acts (e.g., amending the term-limits
law). See generally Initiative & Referendum Institute at the University of Southern Cali-
fornia, at http://www.iandrinstitute.org (last visited March 12, 2004).
3. Golden v. New York City Council, 762 N.Y.S.2d 410 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003),
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638 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
(“City Council”) term limits.  The court upheld the City Council’s
power to enact legislation which amended a New York City Charter
(“Charter”) provision approved through a voter referendum.  Spe-
cifically, the court rejected a challenge by potential City Council
candidates to the City Council’s authority to enact New York City
Local Law Number 27 of 2002 (“Local Law No. 27”).4  Local Law
No. 27 amended the City Council’s term limits law.5  Plaintiffs
sought to invalidate Local Law No. 27 and asked the court to de-
clare that “any further attempt by respondent The New York City
Council to enact such law is subject to a mandatory referendum.”6
In rejecting plaintiffs’ claims, the Golden court clarified when a law
is subject to mandatory referendum.  Its ruling implicitly delineated
the boundaries between direct and representative democracy in
New York City.7  This Case Comment contends that while the ma-
jority’s general holding correctly upheld Local Law No. 27, the
court stopped short of creating meaningful precedent. Rather, as
the dissent aptly asserted, a clear legal threshold must exist that lim-
its the City Council’s legislative authority and defines precisely
when voters must decide through referendum to amend the term
limits law.  In the balance between direct and representative demo-
cratic decisions, there must be unambiguously defined limits on
voter and City Council power.  Clear disclosure in the law will pro-
tect voters’ interests and curb political over-reaching by the City
Council.
Golden resolved a seemingly simple conflict between three laws
enacted at different times through referenda,8 each addressing City
Council-member eligibility and term limits.  In 1989, voters adopted
Charter § 25(a) to coordinate elections with decennial redistrict-
ing.9  Many City Council districts are reapportioned following the
decennial census such that voters find themselves voting for new
and different candidates than they elected two years earlier.  Ac-
4. N.Y., N.Y. Local Law 27 (2002).
5. The specific amended term limits provisions were New York City Charter § 25
(2001), New York City Charter § 1137 (2001), and New York City Charter § 1138
(2001).
6. Golden v. New York City Council, 765 N.Y.S.2d 135, 136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
7. Golden, 762 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
8. The three laws in question were New York City Charter § 25 (a) enacted in
1989 and New York City Charter §§ 1137 and 1138, both enacted in 1993.
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2004] GOLDEN V. NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL 639
cording to Charter § 25(a), the normal four-year City Council terms
would be interrupted with two consecutive two-year terms every
twenty years.  Therefore, City Council members who were elected
for a two-year term in 2001 and a subsequent two-year term in 2003,
would be elected for a four-year term in 2005.  In 1993, New
Yorkers adopted Charter §§ 1137 and 1138 through referenda,
which limited the elected terms of City Council members.10  The
newly adopted Charter § 1137 limited terms of office, as a matter of
public policy, to no more than eight consecutive years.11  Charter
§ 1138 rendered candidates who had previously served in public of-
fice for two or more consecutive terms ineligible to run again for
that office unless a full term had since elapsed.12  The cumulative
effect of these three provisions was to bar incumbent candidates,
who had previously served a four-year term and a two-year term,
from seeking a second two-year term during the twenty-year odd
cycle.  Otherwise, the candidates would serve for more than two
consecutive terms, in violation of § 1138, or would only have served
in public office for six years, two years short of the eight-year limit
mandated by § 1137.
In order to cure this conflict, the City Council, in its 2002 ses-
sion, overrode a mayoral veto to enact Local Law No. 27.13  Local
Law No. 27, which amended Charter § 25, states that:
10. New York City Charter §§ 1137 and 1138 also apply to mayor, public advocate,
comptroller and borough president.
11. New York City Charter § 1137 provides:
[i]t is hereby declared to be the public policy of the city of New York to
limit to not more than eight consecutive years the time elected officials can
serve as mayor, public advocate, comptroller, borough president and coun-
cil member so that elected representatives are “citizen representatives” who
are responsive to the needs of the people and are not career politicians.
12. New York City Charter § 1138:
[n]otwithstanding any provision to the contrary contained in this charter,
no person shall be eligible to be elected to or serve in the office of mayor,
public advocate, comptroller, borough president or council member if that
person had previously held such office for two or more full consecutive
terms (including in the case of council member at least one four-year
term), unless one full term or more has elapsed since that person last held
such office; provided, however, that in calculating the number of consecu-
tive terms a person has served, only terms commencing on or after January
1, 1994 shall be counted.
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640 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
Notwithstanding any other provision of this charter or
other law, a full term of two years, as established by this
subsection, shall not constitute a full term under section
1138 of this charter, except that two consecutive full
terms of two years shall constitute one full term under
section 1138. A member of the council who resigns or is
removed from office prior to the completion of a full
term shall be deemed to have held that office for a full
term for purposes of section 1138 of the charter.14
Under Local Law No. 27, an incumbent candidate running in the
2003 election who had previously served a four-year term and a two-
year term could now serve a second two-year term without violating
the City Charter.
The Golden plaintiffs argued that the City Council overstepped
its authority when it amended this series of referenda.  Voters,
plaintiffs contended, should decide whether to amend the term
limits law directly through referendum.15  The Supreme Court of
Kings County agreed, holding that Local Law No. 27 was subject to
mandatory referendum.  The critical distinction for the lower court
was whether Local Law No. 27 extended the length of terms or
merely altered the qualifications for reelection.16  If the law ex-
tended the length of the terms of office, it was subject to mandatory
referendum.17  If, however, Local Law No. 27 “merely impose[d] a
qualification for office . . . [then it] . . . may not be submitted to the
electorate due to the absence of any express statutory authority ena-
bling the Council to do so.”18  The court heeded plaintiffs’ argu-
ment that the City Council’s consideration of the law frustrated due
process because it shifted power from junior Council-members to
senior Council-members.19  Given the nearly certain re-election of
incumbents and the preference for senior members in leadership
appointments, senior Council-members whose terms would other-
wise end, had an interest in extending the length of their terms.20
14. N.Y., N.Y. LOCAL LAW 27, § 1(B)(25) (2002).
15. Golden, 765 N.Y.S. 2d at 145.
16. Id. at 140.
17. Id. at 139. See infra notes 26-27.
18. Id.
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2004] GOLDEN V. NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL 641
The court found that as a political reality, Local Law No. 27 ex-
tended term length.21 The lower court supported its finding that
Local Law No. 27 affected term length, rather than mere eligibility,
stating that “the enactment of Local Law No. 27 without referen-
dum was inconsistent with the historical practice of enacting term-
limit legislation by referendum.”22  Indeed, Local Law No. 27’s leg-
islative history suggested that “voters should decide any major
change to the term limit law . . . [which] . . .would have to be done
by ballot initiative or voter approved charter revision.”23
The Appellate Division reversed, limiting its inquiry to
“whether a law created by a voter-initiated referendum can be
amended by the New York City Council without referendum.”24
Skirting the City Council’s contentious partisan politics in favor of a
purely procedural tack, the court stated that “we do not consider
whether such action by the City Council is moral, ethical, or politi-
cally advisable.”25
The court pointed to the standard for mandatory voter refer-
endum, which is set out in Charter § 3826 and Municipal Home
Rule Law § 23.27  Read together, the court found that “a local law is
subject to mandatory referendum if it ‘changes the term of an elec-
tive officer’ . . . or if it ‘abolishes, transfers or curtails any power of
an elective officer.’”28  Because Local Law No. 27 “merely amended
21. Id.
22. Golden, 762 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
23. Golden, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 141 (citing Defining Qualification for Council Office: Ad-
dressing the Two Year Inequity, New York City Council Report, 2002).
24. Golden, 762 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
25. Id.
26. New York City Charter §§ 38.4-5 (2001), state that:
A local law shall be submitted for the approval of the electors at the next
general election held not less than sixty days after the adoption thereof,
and shall become operative as prescribed therein only when approved at
such election by the affirmative vote of a majority of the qualified electors
of the city voting upon the proposition, if it: . . . (4) Abolishes an elective
office, or changes the method of nominating, electing or removing an elec-
tive officer, or changes the term of an elective officer, or reduces the salary
of an elective officer during his or her term of office; (5) Abolishes, trans-
fers or curtails any power of an elective officer.
27. Municipal Home Rule Law §§ 23(2)(e)-(f) is the New York State provision that
grants municipalities the right to issue referenda.  The language is much the same as
§§ 38.4 and 38.5 of the New York City Charter (N.Y. City Charter, supra note 26).
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642 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
the term-limit provisions of the City Charter without changing the
length of the term of office, or curtailing any power of the office,”29
it was not subject to mandatory voter referendum.  The court con-
cluded that the City Council, therefore was within its legal right to
amend § 1138 of the New York City Charter.30
Beyond the standard established in the City Charter and the
Municipal Home Rule Law, the court used Caruso v. City of New
York31 as an analogue.  In 1966, voter referendum established Local
Law No. 13-A, which limited membership on a review board to hear
civilian complaints against the New York City Police.32 Caruso in-
volved a challenge to the City Council’s ability to amend the law,
twenty years after it was enacted.33  Despite the scarcity of case law
on the subject, the New York County Supreme Court held that the
City Council was within its authority to amend the law as it would
any other law.34  Voters would have alternative remedies, the court
contended, “[e]ven assuming the Council immediately amended
the Charter following the voter initiative . . . [t]hey could amend
the Constitution, the Municipal Home Rule Law, or perhaps the
Charter, to control or curb Council powers with respect to initiated
legislation.”35  The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed.36
The Golden court found that the City Council had the right to
amend the City Charter regardless of the fact that some of its provi-
sions had been adopted through referenda.37  Quoting Caruso, the
court stated that “laws proposed and enacted by the people under
an initiative provision are subject to the same constitutional, statu-
tory and charter limitations as those passed by the Legislature and
are entitled to no greater sanctity or dignity.”38  The court found
plaintiffs’ proof insufficient to establish that § 1137 reflected voter
intent to insulate the referendum from subsequent legislative acts.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Caruso v. City of New York, 517 N.Y.S.2d 897, 900 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
32. Id. at 898-899.
33. Id. at 897.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 900.
36. Caruso v. City of New York, 533 N.Y.S.2d 379 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
37. Golden, 762 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
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2004] GOLDEN V. NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL 643
Instead, the court found § 1137 to be “merely a statement of pur-
pose, not a mandatory or prohibitory expression of law.”39
In his dissent, Judge McGinity agreed with the majority that
Local Law No. 27 should be upheld, but argued that the court
should go further and declare express language limiting the City
Council’s legislative authority to alter the term limits law without
voter approval.  Judge McGinity proposed that “Local Law No. 27
was validly adopted by the New York City Council only to the extent
that Local Law No. 27 corrects an ambiguity that a City Council
member would be ineligible to serve up to eight consecutive
years.”40  He would “add to the declaration a provision that a City
Council member would be ineligible and unqualified to remain in
office for more than eight consecutive years without a referendum
to amend the New York City Charter. . . to that effect.”41
Unlike the majority, which read Caruso to treat charter provi-
sions enacted through voter referenda the same as other laws re-
quiring amendment or reversal, Judge McGinity read Caruso more
narrowly.  Judge McGinity stated that “Local Law No. 27, relying
upon Caruso, cannot be construed as permitting a member of the
City Council to serve more than eight consecutive years in office
without public approval.”42  He looked instead to the referenda
adopting Charter §§ 1137 and 1138, and concluded that the clear
intent of the majority of New York City voters was to limit to eight
years the maximum period one person could consecutively serve in
the same public office.43
Under Golden, the City Council may amend voter-enacted term
limits laws. While this power is necessary to remedy the conflict of
the anomalous two-year terms every two decades, intent to limit City
Council terms should be unambiguously written into the law.  Such
an explicit declaration is necessary to protect and preserve the
force and character of the voters’ approval of such a law. In turn,
self-interested Council-members are prevented from redefining the
limits of their own terms.  By expressly delineating the authority of
the City Council to enact Local Laws amending voter-enacted refer-
39. Golden, 762 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
40. Id. at 414.
41. Id.
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644 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
enda, a judicial declaration would demarcate the boundaries of vot-
ers’ political power, protecting them from future political
wrangling by the City Council.
As attorneys for the Brennan Center for Justice44 suggest in an
amicus brief advocating that the Golden court uphold Local Law No.
27, “[t]he voters did not, however, knowingly choose to undermine
the Council’s authority even more dramatically by limiting certain
members to six years in office.”45  As a simple matter of public pol-
icy, it is only fair to take seriously a decision voted on with knowl-
edge of its consequences.  Unless voters were well acquainted with
the prior term limit laws, nothing would have led them to believe
that a properly elected Council-member would be prevented from
serving for eight years.  As the Brennan advocates argue, “In short,
the voters of New York City were presented with a simple choice
whether to vote for or against term limits that would limit their rep-
resentatives to eight years in office by limiting them to two consecu-
tive terms.  That is the referendum that voters chose to support.”46
Moreover:
the notion that certain elected representatives would be
limited to six years, rather than eight years . . . never en-
tered the public debate and cannot be considered an in-
tended outcome of the voters’ choice at the polls.  The
people of New York could only have assumed they were
voting for a limit of eight years through two four-year
terms.47
Local Law No. 27 reflects the basic assumption that the Brennan
advocates impute to voters.
The lessons here are two-fold.  First, voters should be afforded
advance notice of the outcomes of their decisions (i.e., what they
44. The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law is “a
non-profit organization in New York City, [that] seeks to bring the ideal of representa-
tive self-government closer to reality.”  Brief of Amici Curiae Brennan Center for Justice
at New York University School of Law et al. at 3, Golden v. New York City Council, 762
N.Y.S.2d 410 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (No. 2003-02410).
45. Brief of Amici Curiae Brennan Center for Justice at New York University
School of Law et al. at 9, Golden v. New York City Council, 762 N.Y.S.2d 410 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2003) (No. 2003-02410).
46. Id. at 6.
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2004] GOLDEN V. NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL 645
are really voting for in the referendum is for their representatives to
be ineligible to run for re-election two years later).  Second, while it
is within the City Council’s legislative ability to correct the conse-
quences of the poorly crafted referendum, there must be limits to
the City Council’s ability to legislate away legitimate choice.  One
solution to this problem is to adopt language, similar to that sug-
gested in Judge McGinity’s dissent in Golden, granting voters the
sole authority to alter the material provisions of the term limits law,
is one solution to this problem.  Doing so assures voters that the
City Council will not disregard their voice on important matters like
the right to electoral choice.
Language specifying that the City Council may not alter mem-
bers’ term limits without referendum has consequences beyond the
division of power between voters and the City Council.  Voters
would be protected against a number of other legal maneuvers
(and their political consequences) designed to amend or overturn
the term limits referenda.  According to Professor Ross Sandler, the
City Charter can be amended or overturned in six ways besides the
enactment of a local law.48  The overwhelming contrast between
these methods and the enactment of a Local Law, like the kind
upheld in Golden, is that each of the alternative methods face many
more hurdles, checks, and have further reaching consequences.
Under any of the other scenarios, the new law would apply to all
municipalities in New York State (which would surely be opposed in
other places).  If the law applied to New York City specifically, it
would require voter approval or the support of much more than
the majority of one local legislative body.  Enacting a local law is the
simplest and arguably the most efficient method of amending or
overturning a voter-approved referendum.  The simple adoption of
48. The six methods are through: (1) State Special Law requiring the support of
the majority of the City Council, the mayor, and the majority of the State legislature; (2)
State general law in which the State Assembly would apply a term limits law to all munic-
ipalities in the state; (3) City Council-initiated special referendum, which, with the ap-
proval of the State Legislature, could allow voters to decide an alternative referendum;
(4) Municipal Home Rule Law amendment passed by the legislature to “allow or man-
date a referendum on term limits whenever initiated by a local legislature;” (5) Voter-
Initiated Referendum, requiring 45,000 signatures to be included on the New York City
ballot; and (6) Charter Commission-initiated referendum in which the Charter Com-
mission could submit a referendum directly to voters. Ross Sandler, New York City Char-
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646 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
language explicitly granting voters the right to determine through
further referenda any material changes to the term limits law would
still allow the City Council to act, as it did with Local Law 27,
quickly and effectively to uphold the obvious will of the majority of
voters.  It would also, however, prevent the City Council from over-
stepping its bounds to materially alter the law.
As Golden illustrates, there is an important balance to be struck
between direct and representative forms of democratic decision-
making.  The legal structure of most state and local electoral sys-
tems demonstrates that voters have the right to decide specific ref-
erenda on matters chosen by citizen initiative or legislative
mandate.  To maintain this balance, the legal boundaries of voter
and legislative power must be unambiguously defined.
